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The Existence of God -- The Foundation of Justice
Written by Raphael T. Waters, PhD.
To understand human nature adequately and its role as the basis of justice, we must have knowledge of mans final cause or end.1 Aristotle and St. Thomas grasped its tremendous significance so that they both dealt with the question of end at the beginning of each of their great treatises. 2 As philosophers have shown from the earliest days, this end is the satisfaction of all our desires and the elimination of all evil -- happiness.3
But does such an end exist? In other words, is there a supremely perfect ultimate end, that is, a good which will bring happiness to man -- in other words, God? For every being seeks perfection in its end, consciously sought by intellectual beings. To understand that the final Cause of mans desires does exist is utterly essential to having an adequate understanding of human nature just as to understand the nature of a car one must understand something about its end -- transportation.4
For the human will cannot be satisfied except by a completely satiating good which must be infinitely good and therefore alone can satiate mans will by fulfilling every desire. If such an infinite Good exists, then justice demands that the perfection of each human person lies in the possibility of its attainment.5 and that we give every man the opportunity to obtain happiness.6 His supreme End ought to be attainable depending on his dispositions at the time. Hence, if there is to be justice, whether individual or social, we must take into account the final Cause of mans existence. As the cause of all causes, the supreme Cause is paramount so that it is urgent that we be certain of its existence -- or whether it does exist as an uncaused Cause of man and his true destiny.
Such a final Cause would put on man the obligation to act according to his nature and hence, an obligation on the rest of us to allow him to obtain that end. Philosophers claim that the rules governing this obligation, the practical principles of reason, are discovered by an adequate understanding of human nature.7 But this requires that man understand that he is caused to exist by a God who is together his ultimate efficient cause, the ultimate exemplary cause, and the ultimate final cause. This end must be the measure of human behavior, the moral order.
If God is the ultimate Cause of human nature, then we need to know His part in our formation. Thus justice and a myriad of other things about man will make sense, for example, the natural moral law which is the basis of justice, death, the familial society, and the political order. Hence, that is the ultimate question for man today yet perhaps never in the history of mankind has atheism become so widespread.
CAN WE PROVE THAT THERE IS A GOD?
An early reply was given by St. Paul, who said, For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.8 However, some modern authors present a caricature of the philosophical proofs while some others who do present the evidence do so inadequately relying on the simple formulation by St. Thomas as presented in the Summa Theologica ignoring the more rigorous presentation found in the Summa contra Gentiles.9 In the former, Thomas certainly has included all the elements but they were so well known in his day that he did not have to elaborate them.
There are, at least, five ways of proving the existence of God each based on one of five defects or limitations discovered in the world around us.10 Each judgment of fact concerns a limitation, which manifests it as an effect, a real effect demanding a proper cause,11 which explains the production of that effect.12 When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of its cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated.13
Whenever a cause exists, what is in the effect pre-exists in the cause,14 for example, a spoon placed in hot coffee will become hot for the heat pre-exists in the coffee. Therefore, by knowing that the spoon is hot, we can know that the causethe coffee itself is hot. Likewise, the design in an artifact pre-exists in the mind of the artisan; for example, a painting, a machine, or a house. Using the same principles of metaphysics, if we can show that some aspects (or some beings) of the world around us are effects, then we can at least deduce the existence of the cause of such an effect. One such being is movement. First, it must be shown that movement is an effect and from this effect we can then deduce that there is in existence a supreme cause of movement.
GIST OF THE PROOF
The precise proof from movement that there is a God takes its starting point from the fact that movement exists and that whatever undergoes movement is moved by another.15 Nothing can move itself (go from potency to act) for to move itself requires that it have the movement (be in act) in order to give itself the movement, that is, it had the movement before it had the movement, which is utterly absurd. Living things move because they are organic, that is, they have many parts and the movement of a part is caused by the movement of another part. Thus, the whole organism moves itself according to imperfect selfmovement.
THE EVIDENCE.
1. BASIC REQUIREMENTS: These are the principles and fact (that is, the premises) of the proof:
a) PRINCIPLES OF REASON:
Principle of movement: Whatever undergoes movement is moved by another. Proper principle of the demonstration from movement. It is a mode of the principle of causality.
Principle of limited regress: In a series of essentially subordinated movers there is no infinite regress.16 This principle is common to all five ways and is a corollary of the principle of causality.
a) FACT: Movement IS.
Conclusion: A first uncaused cause of movement is. This conclusion shows that the first cause of movement is the proper cause17 which moves other things but is not moved itself by another.
2. AIM OF THE ARGUMENT:
The aim of the argument is to show why any moving thing, e.g. a stone, ultimately starts to move, that is, why the stone passes over from can move to does move, from potentially moving to actually moving, from potency to act. Movement is one of the ten modes of being-an accidental being. Movement is not in the nature (i.e. the essence) of a stone -- or it would have been moving. In fact, if movement was in its very nature, it could never be without movement. The question is: What causes that union between a stone and its movement? There is always a proximate cause of it moving (e.g. a stick) but we are searching for an ultimate cause of the motion.
3. FACT OF MOVEMENT:
Movement is defined as: The act of the potential as it is potential. That is, it is the acquisition of something which it only potentially has but does not actually have.
There are four species of movement:
- local movement (or change or becoming): movement from place to place;
- substantial movement: change from one substance to another, e.g. a carrot becomes Robert.
- quantitative movement, e.g. a boy grows bigger;
- qualitative movement: e.g. a spoon changes from cold to hot.
It is impossible to deny the fact of movement for such a denial is itself a movement both of the intellect and of the senses and speech organs. The evidence of our senses clearly indicates that movement exists.
4. PRINCIPLE OF MOVEMENT:
This can again be stated as follows: Whatever undergoes movement is moved by another, or, every moving thing requires an adequate explanation of its movement.18 The principle can be defended thus: The stone either gives itself the movement or receives it from another. If from itself, then it had it or gave it to itself. But it did not have it for it was not moving. It did not give it to itself because it did not have it to give it to itself. Otherwise, this would mean that it had it and it did not have it at the same time. Contradiction! Therefore, in order to avoid absurdity, it must be said that the movement came from another.
Moreover, it did not just come from itself for then the greater would be coming from the lesser, or, something (movement) would be coming from nothing (non-movement).
Summing up: The stone goes over from potentially moving to actually moving, from potency to act, from canmove to does-move. Therefore, if the stone is moving, it is moved by another.
5. ILLUSTRATION:
If we suppose that my hand uses a stick to move a stone, then analysis reveals the following:
HAND: [Uses the stick in order to move the stone. The stick can only move the stone because it is moved by the hand.]
STICK: [The stick moves because it is moved by the hand (cause of its movement, cause that it is moving)
Goes from can-move to does-move, from potency to act.
It can cause the stone to move because it is moved by the hand.
The stick is a moved to-move-mover: It is a mover of the stone but it is moved to do this.
It is a mover but one which is moved-to-move.
Thus: It is an instrument of the hand.
It is an intermediate mover.
It is merely the carrier of the movement to the stone.
In sum: It is a moved-to-move mover.]
STONE: [The stone is moved by the stick in order to go from potency to act, from can-move to does-move. It receives the movement from the hand through the instrumentality of the stick. It is a moved mover.]
6. ESSENTIALLY SUBORDINATED MOVERS:
The kind of movers involved in the proof are those, which are essentially subordinated like the illustration above when the stick is moved by the hand to move the stone. This rules out accidentally subordinated movers.
Some examples of essentially subordinated movers:
COGS: A series of cogs, for example, in a car: Each one pushes its neighbor because it is pushed by another cog, and so on. Each cog is essentially dependent on the one pushing it for its power to push another. Thus, in a series of three, one is a pushed-to-push pusher. Take out any one and all of the others will cease to push. The car will not go! The explanation of the push in each one of the cogs is in the one pushing it.
STAIRS: Each stair supports the one above it because it is supported by the one below it, and that one is supported by the one which is below it and so on. Thus there are supported-to-support supporters. One will support the other because it is supported itself. Take out any one, all those above it will collapse
TRAIN CARRIAGES. The carriages of a train move because each essentially depends on its power to pull another carriage on the carriage which is pulling it. Each pulls the one behind it because it receives movement from the one in front of it. They are pulled-topull pullers. (Pullman class?) The brakeman knows what will happen if they become uncoupled.
In each of the above essential dependencies, there is a procession from potency to act.
Note that, as in any essential subordination, removal of one of the instrumental causes (e.g. a cog, a stair, or train carriage) would cause the instrumental causality of those coming after it to cease.
7. PRINCIPLE OF LIMITED REGRESS:
This is stated thus: In a series of essentially subordinated movers, there is no regress to infinity. OR: In a series of essentially subordinated causes, one cannot go back infinitely nor have an infinite series of movers or causes. This implies that one cannot claim that there is no need of a first cause of the movement, as if they could all keep causing each other right back infinitely. It would be just as foolish to say that if we had an infinite series of tools we would have no need of a carpenter. For each member of the series does not contain within itself the explanation of its movement. That explanation lies outside of itself. Therefore, no matter how many there are, neither one of them nor all of them can explain the movement, which is in each of them and all of them even in an infinite series. They would be all receivers and an explanation for the infi- nite series of movers would still be needed.
An infinite series passing from potency to act would exist without anything actual causing the passage. Nothing, including a supposed infinite series, can move itself from potency to act. It is evident that a spoon cannot move itself from can-be-hot to does-be-hot. For this would imply something coming from nothing, the greater coming from the lesser. There would be no explanation of the residual being.
Moreover, an actually infinite series cannot exist. The concept of the infinite is: no matter how much we have there is more to come. Thus it is unfinished as the term says. Yet to be actual means that it is finished. Thus the actually infinite contains absurdity within the very concept. 19
8. ACCIDENTALLY SUBORDINATED SERIES OF MOVERS:
In order to make the concept of essential subordination even clearer, the notion of accidental subordination should be examined. The following example illustrates this adequately:
TOM: generates
BILL: [Bills act of generation does not depend on Toms act of generation, except accidentally. There is no essential subordination here. Bill was brought into existence; that is the proper effect of Toms act of generation. Bills act of generating Joey, just like his other acts, such as playing tennis, eating, and thinking, are related only accidentally to his act of existence.
Tom may have died yet Bill could still generate Joey. If Bills act depended on Toms act, then in order to generate Joey, all of Toms ancestors would have to be generating at the same time.
Compare this with the movement in the stick.] Generates
JOEY: [Joey is generated to BE. It would be absurd to say that he was moved into generative acts by his father]
Since the existence of Bill and his actions generating Joey are only accidentally (incidentally) related, then it cannot be shown that there is a limit to the number of generants. There is simply no argument. From human reason, we cannot show that there is or is not a limit to the human race and that I cannot go back through an infinite series. We know from the Christian revelation that there was a first man and a first woman but no science can show this nor deny it. It is non-apodictic.
9. SUMMARY: Hence, the argument depends on essential subordination, not accidental subordination. If some movement exists, the principles of reason show us that whatever undergoes any kind of movement is moved by another. Each member of the series of moved movers depends essentially for its movement from potency to act by the movement of the one before it. But there cannot be an infi- nite series of movers. Therefore, there is a first in the series which is the cause of the movement in the others but which is unmoved by another. The explanation of that first mover lies within itself. It does not have movement but is identified with this cause of movement.
CONCLUSION:
From the evidence, the immediate conclusion shows us that there exists an unmoved mover, as Aristotle explained. This is where many philosophers have stopped, not understanding the distinction between potency and act.
However, we arrive at the mediate conclusion that the unmoved Mover must lack passive potency, but if it did have it, in order to act it would have to be moved from potency to act. Then it would not be the first mover. Thus, we would not have the explanation of the movement in the stone. Therefore, the first mover must lack all passive potency. It is not a mover which has the potency for movement, but must be an unmoved mover, that is, it cannot be moved from not possessing a perfection over to acquiring it, but must actually possess it, especially the very act of existence (BE) itself. Rather, it does not merely have BE, but must be identified with BE.20 It is pure act, pure act of existence, pure BE. Its very essence is to be, which is the ultimate perfection. (cf. Who are you, Lord?...I am who am.21) This Being men call God in the English language. Thus, is demonstrated that God is, not that He was.22
Nothing is more certain in itself than the existence of a Supreme Being, foundation of every truth, basis of all law, the eternal law which we know as the natural law,23 and which in turn is applied to rational beings as the natural moral law. This natural law is the binding basis of civil Social Justice Review 168 November/December 2005 law,24 a positive law whereby man governs himself and whereby he seeks justice for all. In the words of Cicero,
There is one, single, justice. It binds human society and has been established by one, single, law. That law is right reason in commanding and forbidding...That is why justice is completely non-existent if it is not derived from nature...and that is why every virtue is abolished if nature is not going to support justice.25
REFERENCES
1. I-II q.1, a.4
2. I, q.2, a.3; Summa contra Gentiles, I, 13; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 1-2; Aristotle, Politics I, 1.
3. I-II q.3, a.1; St. Augustine, The Confessions V, ch. IV; Thomas Higgins, Man as Man. The Science and Art of Ethics, (Rev.) (Rockford, Ill., 1992), ch.II
4. I-II, 1, aa.1, 2.
5. I-II, 3, 8; cf. 5, 1.
6. II-II, 58, 1-2.
7. Higgins, op. cit., 64-69.
8. Romans 1:20; Denz. 1785, 1806, If anyone denies this...let him be anathema.
9. I, 13.
10. I, 2, 3; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, God. His Existence and His Nature, (St. Louis, MO, 1934) I, 242-377.
11. Garrigou-Lagrange, Ibid. I, 73
12. Ibid. 379-381.
13. I, 2, 2.
14. I, 2, 2.
15. See Stanley Jaki, The Physicist and the Metaphysician, The New Scholasticism, vol. LXIII, 2, spring, 1989, for a good discussion of this principle; Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., I, 191ff; Joseph de Finance, Connaissance de létre. Traité dOntologie, (Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1966) 351ff; St. Thomas, Commentary on Aristotles Physics, (trans. Blackwell, Spath, Thirlkel, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,1963) VIII, lect.7.
16. SCG, I, 13, [11]; Aristotle, Metaphysics Bk. II, ch. 2
17. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., I, 379ff.
18. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., I, ch.25-26.
19. I, 2, 3; cf. St. Thomas, Commentary on Aristotles Physics, VIII, Lect. 9.
20. I, 3, 4.
21. Exodus, 3:13-14
22. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., 73ff
23. I-II, 93-94.
24. I-II, 95, 2.
25. Cicero, The Laws, I, 42.
DR. WATERS is formerly professor of philosophy at Niagara University.
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